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JUDGMENTAL NEUTRALITY:  
WHEN THE SUPREME COURT INEVITABLY IMPLIES THAT 
YOUR RELIGION IS JUST PLAIN WRONG 
Lincoln Davis Wilson∗
 
[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs 
should have been submitted to the jury. . . . [T]he First Amendment precludes such a 
course. . . . “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, 
the establishment of no sect.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
We consider it one of the great features of American democracy 
that our government may not make official pronouncements about 
particular religions.  Because the Supreme Court of the United States 
takes seriously the First Amendment’s prohibition of laws “respecting 
the Establishment of Religion, or prohibiting the Free Exercise 
thereof,”2 church and state are kept separate enough that Congress 
may not enact a law, for instance, officially condemning the practice 
of Islam or endorsing the practice of Buddhism.  Moreover, we are 
glad that our courts do not put individual faiths on trial—for exam-
ple, if Catholic beliefs were at issue in a case, the government would 
not permit a priest to be put on the stand to defend before a secular 
judge the historical and rational merits of Catholicism.3  A litigant 
may have to defend the substance of his legal theory before the court, 
but never the substance of his religious faith. 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.M. Music Compo-
sition, 2004, University of Idaho.  I am deeply indebted to Angela Carmella, Anthony 
Rapa, Evan Wilson, and Edward Hartnett for their valuable help in researching, 
drafting, editing, and revising this Comment. 
 1 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872)).
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3 See, e.g., Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (holding that the courts may not adjudicate the 
validity of decisions made by religious tribunals).
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For this reason the above quote from United States v. Ballard4 
rings true.  There, the Court held that religious adherents accused of 
mail fraud could not be prosecuted on the basis of the verity of their 
religious claims, but only on the basis of whether those views were 
sincerely held.5  Intuitively, this seems like a principle rightly inher-
ent in the Religion Clauses. Consistent with the principle of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that government ought to be neutral toward re-
ligion, government ought not state that a particular religious belief is 
true or false.  The Court has kept the promise it made in Ballard; an 
examination of case law will not disclose a single circumstance in 
which the Court has explicitly declared a religious belief to be false.6
However, each of us communicates much more than what we 
state explicitly.  Implicit communication can be logically derived 
from explicit statements.  For instance, if a man says all squirrels are 
rodents and that all rodents are animals, we may infer that he would 
also say that all squirrels are animals.  That he never considers this 
implication, that he says he does not care, even that he expressly de-
nies it (“But I’m not saying all squirrels are animals . . . ”), is no mat-
ter.  If he has asserted the premises are true, he must affirm that the 
conclusion is true.  In some circumstances, our Supreme Court is like 
this squirrel/animal-denier; it expressly declares that it passes no 
judgment on the truth of religious claims, but its premises, and more 
importantly, the decree of judgment it enters, compel the opposite 
conclusion, merely through the dry force of logic. 
Suppose that an individual claimant seeks an exemption from a 
law of general applicability on the grounds of the Free Exercise 
Clause because the law inhibits the practice of his religion.  Assume 
that the inhibited practice is premised on the individual’s belief in a 
universal, objective religious truth.  Suppose then that the Supreme 
Court (or any court for that matter)7 denies this individual’s Free Ex-
ercise claim.  When this occurs, the Court has implicitly asserted that 
this individual’s belief is not true.8  This assertion is fundamentally at 
 4 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 5 Id. at 83–88. 
 6 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Establishment Clause 
case declaring that a permissive separate school district for Hasidic Jews was im-
proper); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Free Exercise case holding that 
the Amish are not exempt from Social Security); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (Free Exercise case granting exception from unemployment compensation 
laws to Seventh-Day Adventist who would not work on Saturday). 
 7 The scope of this Comment is limited to the Free Exercise cases adjudicated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, though the principles of the argument 
would apply equally to all subordinate courts that decide such issues.   
 8 That the Court makes this implicit assertion is not important if considered a 
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odds with the principle of governmental neutrality toward religion 
that has been enunciated by the Court, thus resulting in an ironic in-
stance of what this Comment terms “judgmental neutrality.”  The 
analysis that here follows suggests that the neutrality principle should 
therefore be clarified, modified, or abandoned. 
A few qualifications are in order.  First, this is a descriptive analy-
sis, not a normative analysis.  This Comment will not address whether 
the tests the Court uses in Free Exercise cases comport with the 
United States Constitution, nor will it discuss whether any given case 
was decided correctly under the applicable tests, nor will it weigh in 
on what the result should have been according to sound social policy.  
In addressing individual cases, for instance, this Comment will not 
argue that the religious exemption from compulsory education 
should have been denied in Wisconsin v. Yoder,9 or that the laws-of-
general-applicability principle from Employment Division v. Smith10 vio-
lates the First Amendment. 
Similarly, this is not the work of a zealot (of either the secular or 
religious variety) arguing for a principle of greater separation of 
church and state, or for broader accommodation of the Author’s spe-
cific beliefs.  This analysis does not imply that intelligent design 
should be taught in public schools, and neither does it compel the 
denial of state-funded vouchers for religious education.  Which prac-
tices should be prohibited and which permitted is a policy question 
well beyond the scope of this Comment. 
This Comment will only set forth the logically necessary conse-
quences of the statements and rulings of the Court.  If we accept 
these statements and rulings as premises, then in some circumstances 
we must inevitably conclude that the Court has passed judgment on 
the substance of individual beliefs.  This plain reliance on logic is 
beneficial, for it removes from the ultimate conclusions any partisan 
flavor that could otherwise be insinuated.  If the argument form is 
valid and all premises are agreed upon, then the conclusions here 
private statement by a majority of nine federal judges.  Rather, this implicit assertion 
is particularly significant because it necessarily follows from the Court’s judgment; 
that is, the implicit assertion has as much force as the judgment itself. 
 9 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  The Court granted the Amish plaintiffs an exemption to 
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law where their religious beliefs required less 
formal education than the law demanded.  Id. at 207, 234–35. 
 10 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  In denying Native Americans the right to ingest peyote, a 
controlled substance, for religious purposes, the Court held that facially neutral laws 
of general applicability are presumptively valid against Free Exercise challenges.  Id. 
at 879–80. 
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drawn ought to be equally amenable to the liberal and the conserva-
tive, the Hindu and the Mormon, the Scalia and the Souter. 
Part II will begin with a brief survey of how the Supreme Court’s 
policy of not evaluating the truth of religious beliefs is interwoven 
with its principle of neutrality toward religion.  Part III will state the 
fundamental assumptions undergirding the Comment and set forth 
its formal argument, which is grounded in propositional logic.  Ex-
amples and illustrations will be provided where appropriate.  Part IV 
will apply the formal argument to key cases in the Supreme Court’s 
Free Exercise jurisprudence, and clarify the scope of the thesis.  Part 
V will rebut foreseeable objections to the argument.  Part VI will ad-
dress some of the practical and philosophical implications of the ar-
gument. 
II. THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE AND THE  
POLICY AGAINST JUDGING THE TRUTH OF RELIGIONS 
The Supreme Court of the United States has continually relied 
on a policy of governmental neutrality toward religion in the First 
Amendment Religion Clause cases it has decided over the last sixty 
years,11 even though it has never offered an explicit definition of the 
term “neutrality.”  In the absence of an express definition of neutral-
ity, the term has taken on diverse, contextualized meanings, such that 
both those Justices who favor separation of church and state and 
those who favor accommodation of religion all declare, at least 
nominally, that their interpretation is neutral.12  This ambiguity of 
definition and irregularity of application have caused great conster-
nation for courts and commentators alike, many of whom have ar-
gued for the superiority of one form of neutrality to another.13  Nev-
 11 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (first announcing the neutrality 
principle). 
 12 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80 (Scalia, J.) (holding that facially neutral laws 
of general applicability are presumptively valid); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 
669 (1970) (Burger, C.J.) (adopting the idea of “benevolent neutrality” when hold-
ing that a New York tax exemption for religious organizations did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause). 
 13 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878–84 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing between three uses of neutrality in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence and arguing against formal neutrality and in favor of secular neutrality); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397–98 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the inconsistent application of the Court’s Lemon 
test for Establishment Clause violations); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and 
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1018 (1990) (dis-
tinguishing between three uses of neutrality in religion jurisprudence, and favoring 
the idea of substantive neutrality). 
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ertheless, all agree that, however defined, neutrality is a value to be 
sought after in government interaction with religion. 
The Supreme Court first announced the principle of neutrality 
in 1947 in the case of Everson v. Board of Education.14  At issue was 
whether New Jersey’s reimbursement to Catholic school students for 
school transportation costs was a violation of the First Amendment as 
a law respecting the establishment of religion.15  In an opinion con-
sidered to be the first modern Establishment Clause decision,16 the 
Court used strong, now-famous language setting forth the principles 
of what the government may and may not do: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence 
a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will 
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.17
Some of this language would seem almost antagonistic to relig-
ion, but the Court also made clear that the First Amendment “re-
quires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their 
adversary.”18  Concluding that not allowing the program would 
amount to hostility toward religion, the Court found no Establish-
ment Clause violation, but decided so by a five-to-four margin.19  Ever-
son’s dissenters would not necessarily have adopted a different ration-
ale, but only a different result; the dissenting opinions of Justices 
Jackson and Rutledge actually placed more emphasis on neutrality 
than the majority opinion.20
Neutrality, in one sense or another, has continued to be a key 
component of the Court’s analysis in subsequent Religion Clause 
cases.  Five years after Everson, the Court ruled that a program where 
students were permitted to leave school for religious education was 
not a violation of the Establishment Clause, stating that “[t]he gov-
ernment must be neutral when it comes to competition between 
 14 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 15 Id. at 8. 
 16 See Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 33, 46 (2000). 
 17 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
 18 Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 19 Id. at 18, 28 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 20 See id. at 18–28 (stating that the American education system is premised on the 
idea that a school can “maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion”); id. at 28–
63 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (using variations of the root word “neutral” three times).  
The majority used the word “neutral” only once.  See id. at 1–18 (majority opinion). 
WILSON_FINALV2 4/11/2008  2:20:56 PM 
720 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:715 
 
sects.”21  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court, permitting an exemption for 
the Amish to compulsory education laws, stated that “[a] regulation 
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the con-
stitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the 
free exercise of religion.”22  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah,23 the Court held that: 
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permis-
sible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices 
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is 
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to advance that interest.24
The Supreme Court’s policy of not judging the truth of a relig-
ion is intimately bound up in the principle of governmental neutral-
ity toward religion.  United States v. Ballard was the first case to clearly 
state that the Court will not inquire into the truth of an individual’s 
beliefs in evaluating a Free Exercise claim.25  Though Ballard was de-
cided in 1944, three years before the neutrality principle was first ex-
pressed in Everson, the Court retroactively imputed the neutrality 
principle to the Ballard decision when it decided School District of 
Abington Township v. Schempp26 in 1963: 
The mandate of judicial neutrality in theological controversies 
met its severest test in United States v. Ballard.  That decision put in 
sharp relief certain principles which bear directly upon the ques-
tions presented in these cases. . . . We said: “Man’s relation to his 
God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right 
to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of 
his religious views.” . . . “[I]t would hardly be supposed that they 
could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining 
whether those teachings contained false representations.” . . . 
[Ballard] shows how elusive is the line which enforces the Amend-
ment’s injunction of strict neutrality . . . .27
This use of backwards application is hardly a strained construc-
tion.  Though the Ballard Court did not expressly set forth the prin-
ciple of neutrality, many of the same members of the Ballard Court 
 21 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (emphasis added). 
 22 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 23 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (facially neutral law shown to have been enacted to bur-
den the practice of Santeria violated the Free Exercise Clause). 
 24 Id. at 533 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 25 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). 
 26 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 27 Id. at 244–45 (quoting Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–87). 
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were present for the Everson decision,28 which brought Ballard’s Free 
Exercise reasoning into an Establishment Clause context and first 
announced the neutrality principle.  Ballard’s no-inquiry policy has 
been expressly preserved in later case law, together with the familiar 
neutrality principle.29
III. FORMAL ARGUMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS 
This Comment argues, simply on the basis of deductive logic, 
that in certain circumstances the Court necessarily implies that an in-
dividual’s religious beliefs are untrue.  Because this argument is de-
ductive, its persuasive value cannot be questioned by doubting the 
connection between the premises and the conclusion, but only by 
doubting the truth of the premises.  The premises are few, and they 
are meant to be essentially self-evident.  These premises include the 
Court’s statements of legal principles in Free Exercise jurisprudence, 
 28 Seven members of the Ballard Court were present for the Everson decision; Jus-
tice Roberts and Chief Justice Stone were replaced with Justice Burton and Chief Jus-
tice Vinson.  See SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2007), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/mem 
bers.pdf. 
 29 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in 
many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine 
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (noting in dicta that judicial inquiry 
into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs is prohibited); see also United States v. See-
ger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).  In Seeger, a conscientious objector case, the Court held 
that “[t]he validity of what [respondent] believes cannot be questioned.  Some theo-
logians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question . . . the truth of 
his concepts.  But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government.”  Id. 
Walz v. Tax Commission provides a further illustration of the unity of the no-
inquiry policy and the neutrality principle.  397 U.S. 664 (1970).  In that case, a 
property owner in New York contended that the Tax Commission’s grant of exemp-
tions for church property indirectly required him to make a donation to religious 
bodies and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 667.  The Court found 
it unnecessary to justify the religious tax exemption on grounds of the good works of 
social welfare programs that religious organizations provide for the community: “To 
give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would intro-
duce an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of par-
ticular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day rela-
tionship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.”  Id. at 674.  The unity of 
the two policies is clear here.  The neutrality principle declares that the government 
is not even to consider judging a religion by the social benefits it offers because this 
would come too near to evaluating the truth of the religion itself.  It is also worth 
noting that rather than evaluating the merits of specific religious claims, the Court 
stated that religious organizations are presumptively considered socially valuable: 
“The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life and finds this [tax exemption] useful, desir-
able, and in the public interest.”  Id. at 673. 
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the statements of the individuals’ religious beliefs in those cases, and 
the rulings and results in those cases.  Any meaningful analysis of the 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution must begin with this much.  
This Comment also makes two fundamental assumptions.30  Because 
these assumptions are critical to the argument, a few words in their 
defense are in order. 
First, if an individual thinks a proposition is objectively true, that 
individual sincerely believes the proposition.  This assumption may 
seem axiomatic, or even merely semantic, but perhaps some readers 
are uncomfortable thinking about objective truth in the religious 
context.31  However, most of us would readily acknowledge this axiom 
in areas where we frequently speak of objective truth—mathematics, 
for instance, which is objectively true.  If we think “2 + 2 = 4” is true, 
we believe that 2 + 2 = 4.  An individual may rationally doubt even his 
own existence, but he may not rationally doubt such truths, for they 
are themselves founded in reason.32  In any case, whether as a redun-
dant matter of linguistics or as a necessity of logic, the assumption 
holds—if an individual thinks a proposition objectively true, the only 
rational response is to believe that proposition.33
 30 There is a third necessary assumption to the argument—that the Supreme 
Court operates in a rational and logical manner.  Given that the American legal sys-
tem is premised upon reasoning and argument, the validity of that assumption is not 
difficult to substantiate, and though the Court may sometimes fail in rationality, 
there would likely be few of us who would assert that rationality is not at least an aspi-
rational ideal for our courts.  See infra Part V.B. 
 31 As for objective truth in religion, it is less important for purposes of the discus-
sion here whether a given religion is objectively true, but rather that it claims to be.  
Indeed, most of the major world religions (and many of the minor ones) do claim to 
be objectively true.  See, e.g., AN INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR’AN 32:2–3 (Majid Fakhry 
trans., New York University Press 2004) (est. c. seventh century A.D.) (stating that the 
Qur’an is the truth from Allah); John 14:6 (Revised Standard Version) (“Jesus said to 
him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by 
me.’”); JOSEPH SMITH, THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1:30–33 (1886) (stating that the Mormon church is the only 
church with which God is pleased).  We might even assume that it is because adher-
ents believe a religion to be objectively true that they choose to follow it, perhaps 
even, as in the case of martyrs, kamikazes, and suicide bombers, against their imme-
diate interest in self-preservation.  Many adherents would perhaps choose ways of life 
other than the one commanded by their religion if they felt that the truth was some-
thing they could simply choose.  Whether the reader believes it possible for any relig-
ion to be objectively true is not of particular significance here, for this discussion is 
limited to those religious adherents who claim their religion is objectively true. 
 32 See GEORGE BOOLE, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT ON WHICH ARE 
FOUNDED THE MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF LOGIC AND PROBABILITIES 1–23 (Dover Pub-
lications 1958) (1854). 
 33 The converse of this assumption, that if an individual believes a proposition 
the individual thinks the proposition objectively true, is probably not correct.  Many 
of us believe things by default, things that we would simply like to think are true, or 
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Second, if one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon 
that belief.34  Also axiomatic, this assumption is expressed in such col-
loquialisms as “talk is cheap, put your money where your mouth is,” 
or religious statements such as “[s]how me your faith apart from your 
works, and I by my works will show you my faith.”35  A skydiver shows 
that he really believes in the safety of the parachute when he jumps 
out of the plane, and a social reformer proves she cares for the home-
less when she goes out on the streets to help them.  We may doubt 
the mere words, dreams, or wishful thinking of either the skydiver or 
the social reformer, for apart from action, speech and thought are of 
dubious sincerity.36
The simple conditional modus tollens is the center of this Com-
ment’s formal argument.  Modus tollens is an inherently valid logical 
form37 that, in propositional form, proceeds as follows: 
things that we dimly suspect are true, none of which are supported by any claim to 
objective truth.  The perception of objective truth is a sufficient condition to belief, 
but it is not a necessary condition. 
 34 This is perhaps implicit in Religion Clause jurisprudence.  For instance, the 
sincerity requirement shows that for an action to be protected, it must stem from 
genuine belief.  See, e.g., Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184 (interpreting a religious belief exemp-
tion to the Selective Service in an Act of Congress); DANIEL O. CONKLE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 82 (2003) (“For conduct to qualify as 
the exercise of religion under the Free Exercise Clause, the conduct must, at a 
minimum, be conduct that is sincerely motivated by religious beliefs.”).  Second, it 
should also be noted that the clause itself protects not just the belief, but the exercise 
of religion—the actions that of necessity flow from the belief.  See U.S. CONST.  
amend. I.
 35 James 2:18. 
 36 A strong critique could be leveled against this assumption based on the con-
cept of sin, which could be defined as acting contrary to the behavior compelled by 
one’s beliefs.  The critique would state that because people sin, it is not true that if 
one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon the proposition.  However, this 
assumption may yet be defended on three grounds.  First, the assumption may be de-
fended as a circular tautology—if an individual sins, it shows that the individual did 
not really believe what he said he believed; he at least did not believe it in the mo-
ment of the sin.  This defense makes sense and offers philosophical consistency, but 
it is not supported by anything other than its mere statement and the insistence on 
the assumption as a tautology.  Second, one may argue that all sin inherently 
amounts to a logical contradiction, because it involves acting contrary to the behav-
ior commanded by a moral authority.  Thus to the extent that the American gov-
ernment, the Supreme Court, and the reader presuppose reason as a fundamental 
authority, there should be no allowance for sin, that is, for actions contrary to the 
logic and reason in which our government is presumably grounded.  Third, it may be 
conceded that sin is a counterexample to this assumed proposition but that, in any 
event, the government should not be sinning.  See infra notes 141–47 and accompany-
ing text. 
 37 See JAMES B. NANCE & DOUGLAS J. WILSON, INTRODUCTORY LOGIC 191–92 (4th ed. 
2006).  In an inherently valid argument, if we assume the premises are true, the con-
clusion is necessarily true.  Id. at 129. 
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If P then Q. 
Not Q, therefore not P.38
The following is an example of modus tollens using sentences with 
concrete nouns: 
If it is a squirrel, then it is a rodent. 
It is not a rodent, therefore it is not a squirrel.39
Finally, here is a version of modus tollens most relevant to the dis-
cussion here: 
If one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon it. 
One doesn’t act upon the proposition, therefore one does not sincerely be-
lieve it. 
The modus tollens argument form may also be validly sequenced 
with another modus tollens to create two major premises as follows: 
If P then Q. 
If Q then R. 
Not R, therefore not P.40
Or, as in the discussion here: 
If one thinks a proposition is objectively true, then one sincerely believes it. 
If one sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon it. 
One does not act upon the proposition, therefore one does not think it is ob-
jectively true. 
This Comment posits that when the Supreme Court denies an 
individual’s Free Exercise claim, and the individual’s government-
restricted action is a necessary consequence of the individual’s belief 
in a universal objective truth, the Supreme Court implicitly asserts 
that the individual’s belief is not true.  A hypothetical will illustrate 
how this thesis fits into the modus tollens argument form. 
Suppose that the religion of Wilsonism teaches that everyone 
who wishes to be saved must disobey traffic signals.  Tim thinks Wil-
sonism is objectively true, so he believes this doctrine. Tim wants to 
be saved, so he knows he needs to disobey traffic signals.  The gov-
ernment’s laws, however, require that all citizens obey traffic signals. 
Tim therefore petitions a court for an exemption to the law on the 
ground of the Free Exercise Clause.  Because the court finds that the 
compelling interest of traffic signal enforcement outweighs Tim’s 
Free Exercise Claim, it refuses to grant Tim’s exemption.41  To wit, 
 38 Id. at 191–92. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. at 189. 
 41 This is a crucial point in the argument.  The Court does not care about the in-
dividual’s belief as long as that belief produces action consistent with government 
policy—in other words, where the individual’s actions harmonize with the actions 
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the court will not permit anyone to take the specific action that Wil-
sonism commands for all of humanity.  Therefore the court does not 
think Wilsonism is true. 
Close scrutiny reveals one important difference between the 
propositional version of the modus tollens argument above and the 
subsequent “Wilsonism” hypothetical.  In the former, an individual’s 
failure to act on a belief shows that the individual does not think the 
belief true, where in the latter the court’s denial of the individual’s 
right to practice shows that the court does not think the individual’s 
belief is true.  Normally this would be fatal to the argument, because 
the use of terms is not consistent;42 indeed, it would appear to be a 
subtle equivocation of sorts.  However, there is no logical problem 
here because no switch in terms results when the individual’s truth 
claim is universal.  Where a truth claim is universal, its proponents 
and adherents assert that the truth applies to the court just as much 
as to the individual.  Where the individual’s belief is based on a claim 
to a universal objective truth, the court’s denial of the individual’s right 
to practice implies that the court has judged the belief false.  In the 
hypothetical, Wilsonism claims that even the court itself, for its own 
salvation and that of its members, should not obey traffic signals.  Be-
cause the underlying truth claim is universal, the court’s refusal to 
permit the individual’s religious practice is functionally and logically 
the same as when an individual refuses to perform the action re-
quired by the belief.  Consequently, the court’s denial carries the 
same implicit assertion of falsity as the individual refusal. 
The Wilsonism hypothetical may seem absurd to the reader; it 
would seem to be the sort of strange example that the Court would 
rarely encounter in practice.  However, religions have claimed far 
stranger things, and commanded actions far more loathsome to soci-
commanded by the government’s beliefs, we do not have a problem.  It becomes diffi-
cult when the government action and the individual action are mutually exclusive—
here, obeying traffic signals and disobeying traffic signals.  Thus, the implicit asser-
tion of falsity only occurs when the Free Exercise claim is denied. 
 42 To understand why this could be a problem, consider the modus tollens form 
used above: 
If P then Q.  If Q then R. Not R, therefore not P. 
If one thinks a proposition is objectively true, then one sincerely believes it.  If one 
sincerely believes a proposition, one acts upon it.  One does not act upon the 
proposition, therefore one does not think it is true. 
NANCE & WILSON, supra note 37, at 189–93.  When we replace the statement that the 
individual does not act upon the belief (not-R) with the court’s refusal to allow the 
individual to act upon the belief, we would appear to have a swap in terms (not-R has 
been changed), which renders the argument logically invalid.  However, the univer-
sality of the individual’s belief makes this moot, as addressed in the text following 
this note above. 
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ety.43  Were the Supreme Court to uphold traffic signal enforcement 
against the contrary claims of Wilsonism, few of us would contend 
that the Court made the wrong decision on policy; we do not think 
the universal religious claim of a minority should be allowed to sub-
vert laws beneficial to society.  At the same time, perhaps we are un-
comfortable with the Court implicitly declaring a religion false.  Nev-
ertheless, because of logic, we simply cannot have it both ways.44
IV. APPLICATION OF ARGUMENT TO THE SUPREME COURT’S  
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Reynolds v. United States45
The Supreme Court first decided a Free Exercise claim in Rey-
nolds v. United States,46 an 1878 case on a writ of error to the Supreme 
Court of the Utah Territory.47  The petitioner, Reynolds, had been 
indicted for the crime of bigamy.48  Reynolds was a member of the 
Mormon Church, which declared that the practice of polygamy was 
commanded by several sacred books and by the revelations of Al-
mighty God to Joseph Smith.49  According to the church, failure to 
 43 Consider for instance the Heaven’s Gate cult, where cult leader Herff Apple-
white convinced thirty-nine followers to commit mass suicide with promises that they 
would be taken away by a UFO behind the Hale-Bopp comet in 1997.  See Evan Tho-
mas et al., The Next Level, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1997, at 28.  Consider also that ritual 
human sacrifice in worship of the goddess Kali continues in India, though only as a 
fringe practice.  See Alex Perry Atapur, Killing for “Mother” Kali, TIME—ASIA, July 9, 
2002, at 17, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,322 
673,00.html.
 44 An alternate way to structure this formal argument is to conceive of the 
church-state conflict as a conflict between the normative statements of two authori-
ties.  Suppose a given religion, laying claim to a universal, objective truth, teaches 
that everyone should do X, while the government forbids everyone from doing X 
(which carries the implicit normative command that one should not do X).  If an in-
dividual brings a Free Exercise claim based upon his religion’s command to do X 
and the government denies his claim, the government has implicitly stated that the 
religion’s claim (“everyone should do X”) is false.  At the very least, the government, 
by enforcing its normative commands rather than the commands of the religion, has 
stated that the religion is not a real authority over the government, and thus denied 
the religion’s inherent claims to sovereignty, supremacy, and transcendence.  While 
this argument form is somewhat simpler and more clear than the form used in the 
body of this Comment, it does not result in as clear an assertion of the religion’s fal-
sity because it is not as founded in the nature of epistemology.  It is thus only briefly 
noted here. 
 45 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 46 Id. 
 47 See id. at 153. 
 48 Id. at 161. 
 49 Id. 
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practice polygamy when given an opportunity to do so was damna-
ble.50  Reynolds therefore contended that the verdict in his case could 
only be “not guilty” because he had practiced polygamy out of a sin-
cere belief in a religious duty.51
On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that a prohibition of 
bigamy must be outside the scope of the Religion Clauses, because 
bigamy had long been criminal—it was prohibited at the time the 
First Amendment was adopted, at the time Madison wrote his famous 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,52 and even un-
der the lesser religious liberty protections of England.53  Additionally, 
the Court found that marriage, though sacred, was also a secular mat-
ter, and that the practice of bigamy led to unsavory social results: 
“[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and . . . when applied 
to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism  
. . . .”54  The Court also held that the non-enforcement of a law 
against an individual because of a private belief would essentially lead 
to anarchy: 
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his reli-
gious belief?  To permit this would be to make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in ef-
fect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.  
Government could exist only in name under such circum-
stances.55
Consequently, the Court held that Reynolds’s sincere religious belief 
in the necessity of bigamy would not absolve him of violating the 
law.56
The Mormon Church lays claim to universal, objective truth.57  
By purported revelation from God, the Mormon Church claimed at 
 50 Id. 
 51 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161–62. 
 52 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), 
reprinted in JAMES MADISON, THE COMPLETE MADISON 299 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).   
 53 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164–65. 
 54 Id. at 166. 
 55 Id. at 166–67.  This prompts an interesting question: Is the essence of govern-
ment that it may compel the citizen to do something he or she does not believe in?  
This may be in accord with Max Weber’s definition of the state as the monopoly of 
legitimate use of physical force.  MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION 154 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Free Press 1997) 
(1947). 
 56 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168. 
 57 See JOSEPH SMITH, THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1:30–33 (1886). 
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its founding to be the only church with which God was pleased.58  In 
the Lord’s Preface to The Doctrine and Covenants, God declares to all 
peoples that he who repents and follows the Church’s teachings will 
be forgiven, but he who does not repent will have “the light which he 
has received” taken from him.59  Events subsequent to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reynolds show that the Court correctly understood 
the importance of the bigamy doctrine to the Mormon Church—
when the church, after the Reynolds decision, issued an Official Decla-
ration that it was no longer sanctioning or permitting bigamy,60 Mor-
mon President Wilford Woodruff gave an address lamenting the great 
spiritual cost at which the church had decided to discontinue the 
practice.61
All of these facts together, in conjunction with the logical form 
laid out above, demonstrate the Court’s implicit assertion of the fal-
sity of this Mormon belief.  The Mormon Church, claiming to preach 
truth to all humankind, had commanded the practice of bigamy as a 
means of obtaining salvation.  The Supreme Court, in upholding the 
laws of the Utah Territory, refused to allow the practice of bigamy.  
Because the universal teaching of the Mormon church was directed 
to the Court as much as to any individual, the Court’s refusal to allow 
the practice of bigamy was a denial of the verity of the spiritual belief 
supporting the practice, and further, a denial that the purported 
spiritual authority was objectively true.  The denial amounted to an 
implicit declaration that Mormonism, or at least its plural marriage 
doctrine, was false.  Modus tollens, Q.E.D.62   
This may be a cause for distress—we are uncomfortable that the 
Court, ostensibly grounded in neutrality, would do something so far 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1:1–7, 30–33. 
 60 THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, OFFICIAL DECLARATION 1 
(1890). 
 61 Woodruff’s letter posed to the church this difficult question: 
Which is the wisest course for the Latter-day Saints to pursue—to con-
tinue to attempt to practice plural marriage, with the laws of the nation 
against it and the opposition of sixty millions of people . . . or, after do-
ing and suffering what we have through our adherence to this princi-
ple to cease the practice and submit to the law, and through doing so 
leave the Prophets, Apostles and fathers at home, so that they can in-
struct the people and attend to the duties of the Church, and also leave 
the Temples in the hands of the Saints, so that they can attend to the 
ordinances of the Gospel, both for the living and the dead? 
Wilford Woodruff, President, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Address at 
the Cache Stake Conference (Nov. 1, 1891), in DESERET WEEKLY, Nov. 14, 1891, avail-
able at http://scriptures.lds.org/od/1. 
 62 Quod erat demonstrandum (that which was to be shown). 
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from neutral as to even insinuate that a religious doctrine is false.  But 
whether the conclusion is comfortable or not, it is logically necessary 
from the premises. 
B. Bob Jones University v. United States63
In 1983, the Supreme Court confronted the Free Exercise issue 
within the context of federal income tax exemptions.64 The IRS had 
formerly permitted all religious or educational institutions to qualify 
for tax-exempt status, with contributions to such institutions being 
deductible.65  However, in 1970, the IRS changed its policy such that 
it would no longer offer the tax benefit to institutions that practiced 
racial discrimination, since these institutions could not be deemed 
charitable.66  Bob Jones University is a Christian university whose 
sponsors believed (at the time of the litigation) that the Bible specifi-
cally forbade interracial dating and marriage.67  Because this policy 
was discriminatory, the IRS revoked the university’s tax-exempt 
status.68  The university brought an action for a refund in federal dis-
trict court,69 and the case ultimately came before the Supreme Court 
of the United States via the university’s petition for certiorari.70
Among the university’s various claims for the right to the tax ex-
emption, the university asserted that the IRS regulation was a viola-
tion of the university’s right to free exercise of religion under the 
First Amendment, because the university’s policy of racial discrimina-
tion was based on sincerely held religious beliefs.71  The Court dis-
agreed, reiterating the principle from United States v. Lee72 that the 
First Amendment’s prohibition of restrictions on religious liberty was 
 63 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 64 Id. at 602–03. 
 65 Id. at 577–78; I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1954) (declaring specified institutions 
tax exempt); I.R.C. § 170 (1954) (making contributions to specified institutions de-
ductible). 
 66 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 577–78, 582.  Though the language of § 501(c)(3) 
was disjunctive for religious, educational, or charitable organizations, inter alia, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the exemption had to be read against the background of 
charitable trust law, requiring an organization to be charitable.  Id. at 582 (citing Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980)).  Because racial dis-
crimination was not charitable, institutions that practiced it could not qualify for the 
exemption.  Id. 
 67 Bob Jones Univ., 464 U.S. at 580. 
 68 Id. at 581. 
 69 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D.S.C. 1978). 
 70 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (granting certiorari 
along with companion case, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United States). 
 71 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602. 
 72 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
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not absolute.73  Indeed, a restriction may be justified if it is necessary 
to effectuate a compelling governmental interest.74  The Court de-
clared that the “governmental interest substantially outweighs what-
ever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ exercise of 
their religious beliefs.”75  Further compelling interest analysis re-
vealed no less-restrictive alternative to the IRS regulation, nor any 
room for accommodation of the university’s discriminatory practice.76  
Consequently, the Free Exercise claim failed against the valid regula-
tion.77
Bob Jones University declares itself to be dedicated to Christian 
principles, grounding all of its courses in instruction from the Bible.78  
Bob Jones University does not maintain these beliefs privately, as 
though the truth only applies to the university, but rather believes 
that the Bible and its teachings are universally and objectively binding 
on all of humanity.79  The university’s belief in the Scriptural prohibi-
tion of interracial dating and marriage was strong enough that it in-
stituted a ban of those practices on its campus and punished by ex-
pulsion both those who violated the ban and those who encouraged 
violation.80  The Court even conceded that the discriminatory prac-
 73 Id. at 257–58 (denying an exception to the Social Security system for Amish 
persons and holding that free exercise protection is not absolute). 
 74 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603. 
 75 Id. at 604. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.  Neither did any of the university’s other claims prevail. The Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision was affirmed, and tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University was de-
nied.  Id. at 605.  It should be noted, however, that Bob Jones University has survived 
despite its lack of a tax exemption, and also that it dropped its discriminatory policies 
abruptly in 2000 per an announcement on Larry King Live.  Susannah Meadows, 
Passing the Torch at Bob Jones U., MSNBC.COM/NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2005, http://www 
.msnbc.msn.com/id/6884040/site/newsweek/. 
 78 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579–81. 
 79 Bob Jones University’s philosophy statement emphasizes the institution’s “ad-
herence to the Bible as mankind’s only source of faith and Christian practice.”  Bob 
Jones University, University Mission and Philosophy, http://www.bju.edu/about/ 
mission.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).  The statement also affirms the idea that be-
lief is evidenced by action: 
Biblical values are integrated in every classroom and every other part of 
the educational process. . . . Christian professors and staff members 
encourage students by precept and example to a lifelong commitment to 
learning, teaching, and exemplifying spiritual truths.  The founder’s phi-
losophy that BJU is not here just to teach men and women how to 
make a living, but more importantly, how to live, remains our focus. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 80 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 579–81. 
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tices of the university stemmed from a “genuine belief that the Bible 
forbids interracial dating and marriage.”81
If the Supreme Court, as agent of our government, actually be-
lieved that Almighty God universally prohibited interracial dating and 
marriage, it certainly would not have upheld the IRS regulation—
rather, it would have acted in accordance with its belief, and found 
for Bob Jones.  How could the Court uphold a tax regulation that 
punished those who followed the will of the omnipotent Creator?  
But because the Supreme Court upheld the IRS regulation, and did 
not act in accordance with University’s claim to objective truth, the 
Court showed that it did not believe the dogma of Bob Jones Univer-
sity was correct.  The Court implicitly declared that the university’s 
claim to universal objective truth was false.82  It may not have stated so 
expressly, but the logical implications cannot be avoided.  In the end, 
we may think the Court ruled correctly on the Constitution, civil 
rights, and tax policy, but, however good the policy, can a ruling that 
passes even implicit judgment on a religion be called anything like 
neutral? 
C.  Native American Religion Cases 
The Supreme Court also decided several significant Free Exer-
cise cases involving Native American religion,83 two of which will be 
discussed here.  These cases are significant because in both cases the 
Court admitted it was substantially restricting the religious liberty of a 
minority religion, but purported to do so without either violating the 
principle of neutrality, or passing any kind of judgment on the un-
derlying belief.84  Nevertheless, by the stipulated facts and the ruling, 
the Court implied the opposite. 
 81 Id. at 603 n.28. 
 82 When a religious belief conflicts with a secular law, the Court is obligated to 
decide on the basis of the secular law.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–
67 (1878).  It could be argued that a decision on this basis only shows that policy 
supporting the secular law is “more” true than the religious belief, not that the reli-
gious belief is affirmatively false.  However, the concept of comparative truth will not 
serve us here where the secular law and the religious belief are in direct conflict, that 
is, where the law prohibits what the religion requires or vice versa.   If we grant that 
the policy supporting the secular law is “more” true, then the contradictory religious 
belief is therefore false.  
 83 Of these three significant cases, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), which per-
tains to a Free Exercise claim for avoidance of having a number imposed by the So-
cial Security administration, will be addressed later.  See infra notes 124–28 and ac-
companying text. 
 84 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–90 (1990); Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445–58 (1988). 
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In 1977, the United States Forest Service prepared to complete a 
stretch of road between the California towns of Gasquet and Orleans 
by laying down pavement on a six-mile segment that was previously 
unpaved.85  As part of its preparation, the Forest Service commis-
sioned an impact study of the consequences of developing the road.86  
The study found that the entire area “‘is significant as an integral and 
indispensible [sic] part of Indian religious conceptualization and 
practice[,] . . . [and] successful use of the [area] is dependent upon 
and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the 
most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed 
natural setting.’”87  Construction of the proposed road, the study 
found, “‘would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred 
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems 
and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.’”88
However, the Forest Service chose not to follow the study’s rec-
ommendation that the road not be completed and instead proceeded 
with construction plans.89  Individuals and groups of Native Ameri-
cans, as well as various environmental groups and the State of Cali-
fornia, sued to enjoin the construction of the road.90  The case came 
before the Supreme Court a decade later as Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association.91
Before discussing the merits of the case, the Court noted that 
“[i]t is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere 
and that the Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse 
effects on the practice of their religion.”92  The Court also expressly 
denied that it was evaluating the truth of the Native Americans’ 
claims: “This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying be-
liefs that led to the religious objections here . . . .”93  Additionally, the 
Court declined to adopt the dissent’s proffered rule, which required 
an evaluation of how central a sincerely held belief was to a particular 
claimant’s religion, because such a standard would require the Court 
“to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own reli-
gious beliefs.”94
 85 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. (quoting Forest Service study). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 442–43. 
 90 Id. at 443. 
 91 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 443–45. 
 92 Id. at 447. 
 93 Id. at 449. 
 94 Id. at 458. 
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Despite its acknowledgment of the damage that the construction 
of the road would do to the Native American religion, the Court 
ruled for the Forest Service.95  It stated that “[t]he Free Exercise 
Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to 
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the reli-
gious beliefs of particular citizens.”96  The Court also noted that the 
central principle of the First Amendment was a restriction on what 
government may do to the individual, not what the individual may 
demand of the government.97  The Court provided as a policy ration-
ale that: 
However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government 
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citi-
zen’s religious needs and desires.  A broad range of government 
activities—from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conser-
vation projects—will always be considered essential to the spiritual 
well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held re-
ligious beliefs . . . . The First Amendment must apply to all citi-
zens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public pro-
grams that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion.98
Having articulated the weight of the religious issues at stake,99 
but realizing the negative policy precedent that a favorable ruling for 
the Native Americans would set,100 the Court reversed the ruling of 
the Ninth Circuit, which had favored the Native Americans, and re-
manded for reconsideration of the injunction in light of the Court’s 
holding and other relevant events.101
The religious claim asserted by the Native Americans was both 
universal and objective—the groups appealed not only to the inter-
ests of the tribe, but of all humanity:102 “Individual practitioners use 
this area for personal spiritual development; some of their activities 
 95 Id. at 458. 
 96 Id. at 448 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (denying American 
Indian father exception to Social Security policy on the basis of his religious belief 
where he sought to avoid having a number assigned to his two-year-old daughter)). 
 97 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451. 
 98 Id. at 452.   
 99 Even if the construction of the road would “virtually destroy the . . . Indians’ 
ability to practice their religion,” as the Ninth Circuit suggested, the Constitution 
provided no remedy for the claimants.  Id. at 451–52 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 100 “No disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs 
could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of 
public property.”  Id. at 453. 
 101 Id. at 458. 
 102 Id. at 451. 
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are believed to be critically important in advancing the welfare of the 
Tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself.”103
Regardless of the policy behind this case—whether it was de-
cided correctly under the First Amendment, whether it adequately 
protects the environment, or whether it offers sufficient protection 
from the impositions of religious minorities—there can be no dispute 
about what the ruling is logically saying.  If, as the Native Americans 
claimed, it was in the best spiritual interests of mankind, based on di-
vine mandate, to keep the proposed construction site clear, then the 
government would be utterly foolish to clearcut for the sake of a 
mere road.  More to the point, if the Court really believed in the spiri-
tual necessity of preserving the area, the Court would not have ruled 
as it did.  But it did rule as it did, and therefore the Court did not be-
lieve the religious claim of the Native Americans.  The Court implied 
by its ruling that at least this aspect of Native American religion was 
quite simply false. 
What is perhaps most interesting about Lyng is that the Court 
expressly denied that it evaluates the truth of religions.  Some would 
perhaps suggest that this express statement should cut against the 
implicit analysis set forth here.  However, this Comment submits that 
the force of logic and the eventual result of the road’s construction 
carry much more weight than the Court’s dicta stating the contrary.  
The majority criticized the proffered test of the dissent, which would 
have evaluated the centrality of a particular doctrine to a religion, be-
cause the test required the Court to rule that it understood a religion 
better then its adherents did.104  But setting aside whatever merits the 
dissent’s position may have had, the pitfalls of its test are probably not 
as offensive as the Court’s insinuation of the falsity of a group’s be-
liefs; the majority’s jurisprudence would not even give the individual 
a substantive hearing as to the grounds of his belief, but would none-
theless declare it false. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,105 
another case pertaining to Native American religion, has perplexed 
commentators and redefined interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause.106  The respondents, Smith and Black, were two Native Ameri-
cans who were fired from their jobs at a drug rehab center because 
 103 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added). 
 104 Id. at 457–58. 
 105 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 106 See, e.g., Thomas F. Lamacchia, Reverse Accommodation of Religion, 81 GEO. L.J. 
117, 120–39 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme 
Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259. 
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they used peyote, a controlled substance.107  They thereafter sought 
unemployment compensation, which was denied because their dis-
charge was for work-related misconduct.108  Before the Supreme 
Court was the question of whether the First Amendment permitted 
denial of unemployment compensation for religious drug use.109  The 
Court ultimately held that because Oregon’s unemployment provi-
sions were facially neutral laws of general applicability, they were valid 
even without a sacramental exception for peyote use, and the denial 
of unemployment benefits to Smith and Black could stand.110
The Court’s opinion in Smith does not reveal whether Smith and 
Black asserted that their religious use of peyote stemmed from belief 
in a universal truth.111  However, one of the lower court opinions ear-
lier on in Smith’s procedural history notes that “[Black] testified that 
he was not required by the [Native American] church to take peyote, 
but that it was a personal decision.”112  The absence of a religious re-
quirement to ingest peyote cuts against a finding that the use of pe-
yote was a universal mandate of the Native American religion.  Since 
the universality of the religious claim is an essential element of the 
argument in this Comment,113 the lack of a universal claim in Smith 
means there was no implicit assertion by the Court that Smith’s and 
Black’s beliefs were untrue.  However, Smith is significant not merely 
for its holding regarding Smith’s and Black’s use of peyote, but for its 
broader implications, for Smith holds that laws of general applicability 
are presumed valid, despite that they may burden individual religious 
practice.114
If a law and an objective and universal religious belief command 
contradictory modes of conduct, one or the other must fall.  The 
government restriction may be withdrawn or amended, or the reli-
gious adherent may be forced to cease practice, but there will be no 
peaceful coexistence.  Because the religious action stems from belief 
in a universal, objective truth, and the law presumably stems from the 
government’s policy beliefs, resolving the dispute between religious 
observance and governmental action will either implicitly assert that 
 107 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 876. 
 110 Id. at 890. 
 111 Id. at 872–74. 
 112 Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). 
 113 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 114 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
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the religious belief is false, or that the contrary governmental policy is 
not as important as it was first claimed. 
Smith declares that facially neutral laws of general applicability 
are presumptively valid, and need provide no exception for contrary 
religious practices.115  Before Smith, the Court was more ready to find 
that the religious interest could be reconciled with governmental pol-
icy through an exception,116 but post-Smith, where the governmental 
action is presumptively valid, the contradictory religious claim gener-
ally will not stand.  Logic then leads us to the implicit holding of 
Smith: if an action contradictory to generally applicable law is prem-
ised on belief in a universal, objective truth, the substance of that be-
lief is presumptively false.  Thus presumptively valid state action often 
amounts to presumptively false religion. 
The Smith doctrine is very difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile 
with the policy of governmental neutrality toward religion in which it 
is ostensibly grounded.117  The Court adopted as a rule of decision a 
footnote from United States v. Lee, that “the right of free exercise does 
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law pro-
scribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).’”118  Douglas Laycock, discussing the different uses of the 
term “neutrality” in Supreme Court Religion Clause jurisprudence, 
criticizes the Smith doctrine, which he calls “formal neutrality,” noting 
that it can often be discriminatory and lead to absurd results.119  How-
ever, even more significant than Laycock’s policy objection to the 
 115 Id. 
 116 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting an exception for 
the Amish to compulsory education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
(mandating payment of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarian in face of contrary 
state law). 
 117 In the public outcry after Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which required government action that substantially 
burdened a religious practice to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state in-
terest.  Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb (2000)).  In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–36 (1997), the Court 
held that the original version of RFRA violated principles of federalism and was un-
constitutional as applied to the States, which prompted Congress to revise RFRA ap-
propriately.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (2000).  For the purposes of the discussion 
here, it is not so much important what the specific law or standard of review for reli-
gious issues is, but rather that the judicial decrees in the cases discussed here imply a 
statement that the religious belief in question is false.  Regardless of whether Reynolds 
or Lyng would be binding precedent today, we know that in the context of their time, 
the cases delivered this implicit message; that in itself should be cause for concern. 
 118 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 
(1982)). 
 119 Laycock, supra note 13, at 999–1001. 
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Smith doctrine is that because of the doctrine, a “neutral” law of gen-
eral applicability may be anything but—it may ultimately pass judg-
ment on the truth of religion, which is hardly reconcilable with any 
definition of neutral.  In Smith, the Court cited Ballard and carefully 
noted that the government may not “punish the expression of reli-
gious doctrines it believes to be false”120—but merely by punishing the 
individual’s doctrinal expression in action, the Court declares the doc-
trines false, violating Ballard inadvertently. 
D. Exceptions 
Though the Court has made implicit judgments of the truth of 
particular religions in the cases and circumstances set forth above, it 
is not this Comment’s contention that the Court judges the truth of a 
religion whenever it decides a Free Exercise case.  When certain ele-
ments of the thesis are absent or otherwise changed, no implicit truth 
judgment results. 
First, the Court makes no implicit judgment of a religion’s truth 
when it permits the religious practice to continue, either through an 
exception or by declaring the government restriction void as uncon-
stitutional.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,121 where the Amish sought an excep-
tion to a Wisconsin law that made education compulsory until age 
sixteen, the Court held that a religious exception was proper because 
the government’s asserted policy interest in the law was already ade-
quately served by Amish practice.122  Did the Court’s allowance of the 
Amish religious practice constitute an implicit declaration that Amish 
beliefs are true?  Hardly—to suggest so would be the logical fallacy of 
affirming the consequent.123  Therefore the implicit declaration only 
exists when the Free Exercise claim is denied, and it can only implic-
itly assert falsity, not truth.  Indeed, the religious practices that the 
government allows—whether Amish education, the Catholic mass, or 
Muslim prayer—are permitted because they are consistent with govern-
 120 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 
(1944)). 
 121 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 122 Id. at 221–26.  The Court held that the Amish did not foster ignorance and 
were adequately equipped to participate in contemporary society and in the democ-
ratic process.  Id. at 223–26. 
 123 “Affirming the consequent” is an invalid logical form, i.e., if the premises are 
true, the conclusion is not necessarily true.  The form goes as follows: If P then Q. Q, 
therefore P.  If it is a squirrel, then it is a rodent.  It is a rodent, therefore it is a squirrel.  See 
NANCE & WILSON, supra note 37, at 191–92.  Here, affirming the consequent looks 
like this: If one believes the Amish religion, one permits its practices.  The Court 
permits Amish practices, therefore it believes the Amish religion. 
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ment policy,124 not because the government believes all of these relig-
ions are true.  A wide variety of beliefs may be consistent with observ-
ing the law, but these beliefs are not thereby endorsed by the law be-
cause of this consistency.  Tolerance is not approval. 
Second, no implicit assertion of falsity results from the Court’s 
denial of a belief that the adherent does not claim to be universal.  In 
Bowen v. Roy,125 Stephen J. Roy, a Native American, protested the use 
of a Social Security number for his daughter, Little Bird of the Snow 
Roy, because he believed the use of the number would rob her of her 
spirit.126  The Supreme Court ruled that the Social Security Admini-
stration’s effort to impose and use a number for Little Bird of the 
Snow did not violate the Free Exercise clause.127  Roy made no asser-
tion (on record) that the imposition of a Social Security number 
robbed everyone of their spirits, i.e., Roy did not state that this pur-
ported truth applied to anyone other than Little Bird of the Snow.128  
Had he made such an assertion, the Court’s denial of his religious 
exception would, in his view, amount to the robbery of the souls of 
every American citizen.  In such a hypothetical case, the Court’s de-
nial of the claim would have implied that the Court did not believe 
the Social Security system was mass soul robbery.  But because Roy’s 
religious belief only applied to Little Bird of the Snow, the Court’s de-
cision did not necessarily pass judgment on that belief.  Namely, the 
Court could still have actually agreed with Roy’s belief, and yet held, 
albeit uncomfortably, that the public interest of uniform administra-
tion of Social Security outweighed the individual interest of the pro-
tection of Little Bird of the Snow’s soul.129
Third, the Court makes no implicit assertion of falsity if the indi-
vidual does not claim that the restricted practice is based on objective 
truth.  Where an individual maintains a religious belief and practice, 
but also allows that other directly contradictory religious practices 
may be equally valid or “true,” the argument fails, because proposi-
tional logic cannot be applied.  Essentially, if the claimant admits that 
“A and not-A” might be “true” in the realm of religion, there will be 
no logical consequence to a restriction of the claimant’s religious 
practice, because logic simply has no business with “A and not-A.”  
 124 Or perhaps not inconsistent with government policy. 
 125 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 126 Id. at 695–98. 
 127 Id. at 712. 
 128 Id. at 695. 
 129 Perhaps this was a regulatory taking of the property interest of the soul, but 
not such as would require compensation under the Takings Clause.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V; see also, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 411–16 (1922). 
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The individual may be offended by the Court’s restriction of his reli-
gious liberty, but he does not suffer an implicit assertion that his be-
lief is false.  While some readers may find sympathy with such subjec-
tive ideas of “truth,” the Court has yet to encounter a Free Exercise 
claim premised on such an idea,130 and many major world religions 
are founded on an idea of objective spiritual truth.131
V. REBUTTAL 
A.  No Express Judgment of Religious Beliefs 
One might argue that the thesis of this Comment is without sup-
port because the Supreme Court has expressly declared that it does 
not judge the truth of an individual’s religious belief when evaluating 
a Free Exercise claim.132  But which is more significant here, the ulti-
mate result of a Free Exercise case, or the statements the Justices 
make about what principles controlled the result?  A man may make 
earnest declarations of his love for his wife, but if he sleeps with other 
women every night, we are inclined to suspect that his practice is 
more controlling than his professions otherwise. 
However, this is not to suggest that the Court privately articulates 
definite decisions about religious truth, as though its deliberations in 
Reynolds led the Justices to conclude Mormonism was false.  This 
Comment alleges no bad faith or ill will toward religion on the 
Court’s part, but rather contends that the Court’s assertion of reli-
gious falsity is implicit, just below the surface.  Indeed, because the 
statement is implicit, many of the Justices may never have been cog-
nizant of it.  Few of us realize all the things our actions reveal about 
our beliefs, but we cannot quarrel with logic.  In fact, the Court’s di-
rect statements on the constitutional policy133 of not inquiring into 
the truth of a religion actually lend greater importance to this Com-
ment’s argument, for they disclose a hidden conflict between our 
lofty legal policy and some rather inconvenient facts—this is a con-
flict that ought to be resolved. 
 130 That no party argues before the Court that his or her religion is merely subjec-
tively true may indicate the diminished persuasive value of subjectivity and personal 
opinion. 
 131 See supra note 31. 
 132 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 
(1988); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). 
 133 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (discussing “the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 244–45 (1963) (discussing the unity of the no-inquiry and neutrality 
policies in Ballard). 
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It might then be argued that the Court has at least followed its 
policy of not making an inquiry per se into the truth of a religion.  In 
other words, assuming the thesis of this Comment is correct, and the 
Court does make these implicit assertions of falsity, at least it never 
puts a religion on trial to defend the empirical, rational, or legal mer-
its of its faith.134  It is true that a court would not put an Islamic cleric 
on the stand to testify to the Qur’an’s divine inspiration, nor would it 
make factual findings about the Catholic doctrine of ex cathedra.135  
But is this entirely a good thing?  Which is worse, judging a religion 
based on its merits as presented to the court, or judging it implicitly 
without giving it an opportunity to be heard, and then denying that 
any judgment was ever made?  Granted, neither of these alternatives 
is particularly appealing, but the first is at least self-consistent. 
B. Government Regulates Action, but this Says Nothing About  
Truth of Belief 
It could also be argued that though the government may restrict 
action, it may never restrict individual belief, and thus its denial of an 
individual’s freedom of religious practice would not imply that the in-
dividual’s beliefs are false.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has enunciated 
this principle in some capacity: “Thus the Amendment embraces two 
concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is abso-
lute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”136  However, 
such a distinction will be fatal to the argument here only if its second 
assumption (if you sincerely believe, then you act)137 is disproved.  We 
may intellectualize and posit the existence of a world where belief 
could be meaningful without action, but rare would be the religion 
that would concur.  Even Protestant Christianity, which uniquely em-
phasizes the doctrine of sola fide (faith alone),138 affirms wholeheart-
edly the Scripture that “faith, if it has no works, is dead.”139  Not even 
the Supreme Court itself will permit such a wall of separation—
consider its words in Wisconsin v. Yoder: “This case, therefore, does not 
become easier because respondents were convicted for their ‘actions’ 
in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this 
 134 It could be argued, however, in such cases as Dover, where the court denied the 
teaching of intelligent design in public schools based on the merits of the theory, 
that the court has in effect put religion on the stand.  Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. 
Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 135 See, e.g., Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86. 
 136 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
 137 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 138 See, e.g., Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XI (1646). 
 139 James 2:17. 
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context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight 
compartments.”140  Finally, the government clearly agrees as well, for 
it expects a belief that is more than mental.  It would be unlikely to 
allow a citizen not to observe federal law simply because the citizen 
believed that following federal law was a good idea.  The state expects 
obedience and not mere lip service; should not obedience be ex-
pected of the state? 
But perhaps the action-belief connection may be criticized on 
the basis of sin—if sin is when we know the law and believe the truth, 
but we do not act accordingly,141 the second assumption of this Com-
ment142 is disproved by the fact of sin, for it is possible to believe 
something sincerely without acting upon it.  Sin, at least as a concept, 
is something of which we are all aware, and perhaps the government 
is, like all of us, simply human—that the government does not act on 
a belief does not necessarily indicate that it does not hold the belief. 
The assumption may nevertheless be defended on three princi-
pal grounds.  The first two are relatively esoteric and philosophical, 
and thus relegated to the footnotes.143  The third is of practical im-
 140 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
 141 “Whoever knows what is right to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin.”  James 
4:17. 
 142 If you believe, then you act.  See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 143 First, the assumption could be defended as a tautology, and therefore de-
fended circularly.  Sin may be an action not in accordance with a stated belief, or 
with a previously held belief, but in the moment of the sin, the individual shows that 
he does not really believe what he says he believes—otherwise he would not have 
done it.  If a Catholic genuinely believes that God will damn the adulterer, but com-
mits adultery later, he shows that his belief did not hold firm in the moment of temp-
tation, because no possible reward of adultery is greater than eternal punishment.  
See, e.g., Proverbs 7:27 (saying of the adulteress that “[h]er house is the way to Sheol, 
going down to the chambers of death”); DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY 9–10 
(Lawrence Grant White trans., Pantheon Books 1948) (1321) (condemning in Canto 
V of the Inferno the lustful to the second circle of hell, though a reader could, in ru-
minating upon Dante’s glorification of Paolo and Francesca, conceivably desire such 
a punishment more than paradise).  Applying this understanding of sin to this argu-
ment, perhaps the Court does not generally disbelieve in the truth of the religions the 
practice of which it prohibits, but only disbelieves them in the moment of its deci-
sions.  However, it would be strange that such behavior, neither noble nor predict-
able, should be bound up in the Court’s bedrock principle of neutrality. 
Second, the assumption may be defended on the ground that sin ought to be 
counted as inherently irrational.  When an individual consciously sins by breaking 
some moral law, that is, when he does what he knows he ought not do, he engages in 
a kind of self-contradiction.  He simultaneously affirms the authority of the lawgiver, 
by granting it ought-ness, and denies that lawgiver’s authority, showing with his law-
breaking action that he believes the authority without power to punish him to the 
point of deterrence.  See C.S. LEWIS, MIRACLES 56–58 (HarperCollins 2001) (1947) 
(offering a discussion of this ought-ness).  Consider also the apostle Paul’s words in 
the epistle to the Romans as an example of the irrationality of sin: 
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portance here: what business does our government have with sin-
ning?  This is not asked to suggest that the government should con-
form itself to a particular notion of right and wrong, that is, to avoid 
sin in the religious sense (it would thus become a theocracy), but 
rather that the government should conform itself to what it believes.  
If the government believes something, it should act accordingly; it 
should not sin against its own acknowledged truths.  If our govern-
ment is premised on the idea that all men are created equal,144 then 
our governmental structure should reflect the premise,145 and our 
courts should enforce the principle.146  In fact, much of legal scholar-
ship (in which grand tradition this Comment hopes to continue) is 
fundamentally concerned with getting the government to, in effect, 
stop sinning—when an author writes a piece criticizing a decision of 
the Court or a piece of legislation as unconstitutional or otherwise le-
gally erroneous, the author is in effect saying that the government is 
acting contrary to its beliefs.147  Perhaps this Comment may be at-
tacked on the basis that the government is human and does not exe-
cute what it says it believes, but so can many other valid works of legal 
scholarship.  It may even be unrealistic to expect that the government 
will ever stop “sinning,” but there is certainly value in working toward 
that goal. 
I do not understand my own actions.  For I do not do what I want, but I 
do the very thing I hate . . . . For I know that nothing good dwells 
within me, that is, in my flesh.  I can will what is right, but I cannot do 
it.  For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I 
do.  Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin 
which dwells within me. 
Romans 7:15–20. 
Here, Paul is consumed by the sub-rational, instinctual force of sin, which com-
pels him to do what he knows he ought not.  Thus, to the extent that sin is inherently 
irrational, it has no place in this argument and need not be accounted for, since this 
Comment has presumed reason as a fundamental authority and ground of the dis-
cussion.  This Comment will not quarrel with mere instinct.  Further, as applied to 
the issues here, if we assume the government’s “sin” is irrational, we would all readily 
acknowledge this irrationality ought to be avoided. 
 144 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 145 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
 146 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 147 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425–
27 (1987) (arguing the Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and other deci-
sions are inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty inherent in the Con-
stitution); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1713–30 (2000) (criticizing some as-
pects of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic 
Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 1843 (2004). 
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Finally, it is simply not meaningful to speak of the protection of 
the freedom to believe apart from the freedom to act.  The freedom 
to believe is inviolable—while a government may compel an action, it 
can only influence a belief.  A government could endorse one religion 
and condemn another,148 and a government could even force an in-
dividual to recant a belief under penalty of death149—but to recant is 
one thing, and to change one’s mind is quite another.150  Recall the 
words that Galileo supposedly muttered after he was forced to recant 
his heliocentric view of the universe: “And yet it moves.”151  We call 
those who believe but do not act hypocrites, and thus the gracious 
governmental “freedom” to believe and not to act is little more than 
the freedom to be a hypocrite. 
C. The Court Simply does not Consider Religion when  
Deciding a Case 
One might finally argue that the Court does not imply a religion 
is false when it denies a Free Exercise claim because the Court simply 
does not make decisions on the basis of religion at all.  Because of Jef-
ferson’s famous “wall of separation,”152 it could be argued, the sacred 
 148 England, for example, swung between official Catholicism under Mary I and 
official Protestantism under Elizabeth I, with both queens punishing dissidents with 
death.  JOHN GUY, TUDOR ENGLAND 226–308 (1988). 
 149 For instance, under the reign of Mary I, Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Can-
terbury and author of the Book of Common Prayer, recanted the heresy of which he 
had been convicted when threatened with being burned at the stake.  DIARMAID 
MACCULLOCH, THOMAS CRANMER: A LIFE 555–605 (1996). 
 150 However, Cranmer took back his recantation and was sentenced to death.  Id. 
at 603–05.  At the stake, he was asked again to recant to save his life, but instead he 
thrust into the fire the hand that had signed the first recantation.  Id. 
 151 This well-known legend, though it is apocryphal, illustrates the inability of the 
state (or there, the church) to coerce belief.  See A. Rupert Hall, Galileo nel XVIII se-
colo, 71 RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA 83, 375–78 (1979). 
 152 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Jefferson’s lan-
guage regarding the “wall of separation” between church and state, and suggesting 
that this principle inheres in the First Amendment).  For an argument supporting a 
strict application of Jefferson’s “wall of separation,” see Richard Rorty, Religion As 
Conversation-Stopper, in RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168–74 (1999).  
Rorty contends that religious views ought to be barred from civil discourse as prem-
ises for establishing law, for that enterprise ought to be guided by purely secular con-
siderations.  Id. at 169, 173.  Rorty graciously applies this standard to his own athe-
ism, allowing that under his model, neither he nor the religious devotee would be 
permitted to contend for the philosophical premises supporting their political con-
clusions on any ground “save the assent we hope they will gain from our audience.”  
Id. at 173.  While this pragmatic approach may sometimes produce political consen-
sus, it has no tendency to produce truth or good, because, as David Luban has noted, 
the goodness of all pragmatic aims depends upon the correctness of the premises 
supporting them.  See David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, 18 
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and the secular are kept apart such that the purely secular political 
decisions of the Court do not impinge upon the religious convictions 
of the individual.  The Court knows no dogma—it believes no relig-
ion; it disbelieves no religion.153
However, an appeal to the separation of church and state here 
assumes that because the two concepts can be kept separate theoreti-
cally, they can be separated in practice.  How do we determine the 
province of the state and the province of religion?  What makes 
something a religious issue?  But for cases such as Smith, most of us 
would have assumed that the degree to which a government chooses 
to restrict drug use is a secular matter.  However, because Smith and 
Black asserted that their use of peyote was a religious practice, what 
had first seemed to be exclusively secular became a disputed religious 
issue.154  The same could be said of Lyng, for if anything seems com-
pletely secular, it is the building of roads.  Yet because Native Ameri-
cans asserted that the proposed site for the road was essential to their 
religious practice, the construction of a highway became a religious 
issue.155  The Court has spoken of the “purely secular considerations” 
of a restrictive law in analyzing a Free Exercise claim,156 but how can 
something about which a claimant has ultimate religious views be 
called “purely secular?”  Does the Court then define what is secular 
and what is sacred?157  That, of all things, would hardly be neutral. 
It might be argued then that the Court simply does not care 
whether a religion is true when it decides a case.  This is probably 
correct, because the Court goes out of its way not to consider the 
truth of a religion when adjudicating a Free Exercise case,158 but that 
does nothing to obviate the implicit statement resulting from the 
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 51 (1996); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS 
FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 44 (2003) (criticizing Rorty and arguing that the 
problem is not that fundamental premises are discussed in public debate, but the 
manner in which these premises, sacred or secular, are introduced). 
 153 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872)).
 154 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); supra Part IV.C. 
 155 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); supra 
Part IV.C. 
 156 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).  “A way of life, however virtuous 
and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of 
education if it is based on purely secular considerations . . . .”  Id. 
 157 The Court does, at least, define what religion is for some statutory purposes.  
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (defining the “religious training 
and belief” exemption in the Universal Military Training and Service Act as “[a] sin-
cere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel 
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption . . . .”). 
 158 See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86. 
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Court’s judgment and decree.  A man may say he does not care 
whether Islam is true, but we can tell he does not think the religion is 
true if he does not pray five times daily toward Mecca.  The principle 
goes the same for the Court; indeed, it may not remotely care 
whether any of the religious doctrines that appear before it are true, 
but its apathy can communicate just as much as its concern. 
There is an inherent overlap of church and state;159 it is the over-
lap of reality.  Religions have stated authoritative positions on almost 
every aspect of our lives,160 and the government regulates almost every 
area of our lives.161  Religions make commands of all mankind on the 
basis of purported divine authority, and the government makes laws 
that apply to all citizens on the basis of its capability of enforcement.  
Because of the concurrent jurisdiction of the sacred and the secu-
lar,162 there will always be an abundance of conflict between church 
and state.  Such conflict, as when the government prohibits polygamy 
and Mormonism promotes it,163 must be resolved.  A fundamental 
contradiction between the commands of the state and the commands 
of religion may be resolved either by the government altering its laws 
 159 Consider the Court’s words in Lynch v. Donnelly: “In every Establishment Clause 
case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing 
unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the real-
ity that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible.”  465 
U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (emphasis added) (holding that display of a crèche during the 
holiday season did not violate the Establishment Clause because in context it was not 
an endorsement of religion). 
 160 Such as tithes, the afterlife, and gay marriage. 
 161 Such as income tax, estate tax, and marriage licenses. 
 162 Consider these remarks of Rousseau: 
While things were in this situation, Jesus came to establish a spiritual 
kingdom on earth, which, by separating the theological from the po-
litical system, made the State no longer one, and caused those intestine 
dissensions which have never ceased to agitate the Christian peoples.  
This novel idea of a kingdom of the other world could never have en-
tered the heads of pagans, and they always considered the Christians as 
really rebels, who, with a hypocritical air of entire submission, were 
only seeking the opportunity of rendering themselves independent and 
masters by artfully usurping the authority which in their weakness they 
pretended to respect.  This was the cause of the Christians being perse-
cuted. . . .  However, as there had always been a prince and civil laws, 
the consequence resulting from this double power has been a perpet-
ual conflict for jurisdiction which has made any system of good polity 
impossible in Christian States; and men could never certainly inform 
themselves whether it was the master or the priest they were bound to 
obey. 
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 117 (Charles Frankel ed. & trans., 
Hafner Publishing 1957) (1762). 
 163 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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to grant permission (where the government admits it was wrong), or 
by the continued restriction of a religious practice, in which case the 
government says that the religion is wrong.  Thus, pointing to the 
church and state distinction cannot answer the question.  Should the 
principles of logic be suspended by this “wall of separation?” 
Moreover, because church and state strive to control the same 
facets and arenas of life, government can hardly be neutral toward re-
ligion.  When a court adjudicates a Free Exercise case, it is issuing a 
decision concerning the extent of the authority of another claimed 
sovereign, namely, the individual’s religion.  Where two sovereigns 
claim rights to the same territory, we would not trust the tribunal of 
one sovereign to be a neutral arbiter of the dispute; it is for this rea-
son that the Constitution commits disputes between states to the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—a superior sovereign.164  
Similarly, because the State seeks to govern much of the same terri-
tory as Religion, it cannot pretend to be neutral when adjudicating a 
conflict between a religious adherent and the government, since it 
has a vested interest in the matter165 (and unfortunately, there is no 
superior sovereign to whom this dispute may be taken).  This is not to 
suggest that the government should recuse itself from deciding such 
issues, for if the courts would not adjudicate any matters that pre-
sented religious questions, the courts could not adjudicate much of 
anything.  A less-than-impartial decision may be better than no deci-
sion at all.  But if the courts must adjudicate, they ought to do so 
without pretending to such a “lofty neutrality.”166
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
The implicit judgment of individual religious beliefs described 
here is essentially inevitable.167  The only way to avoid this judgment 
 164 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 526 U.S. 589 (1999) 
(adjudicating the question of whether certain portions of Ellis Island belonged to 
New York or to New Jersey, and finding for New Jersey). 
 165 One might ask how this situation is any different than an everyday criminal 
trial, where the government is both a party (the prosecution) and at the same time 
an adjudicator (the judge), yet is expected to be neutral.  The matters addressed 
here are distinct because the very heart of the issue being addressed in a religion 
case is the state’s sovereignty—not necessarily whether the state has the actual power 
to do as it wishes, but whether, as the religious adherent claims, there exists a higher 
Sovereign to which the state must answer.  In a criminal prosecution, this fundamen-
tal philosophical conflict is not implicated; it is merely a question of the relationship 
of the accused to the laws above him. 
 166 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 167 This phenomenon is probably not unique to the United States government, 
but may be inherent in any non-theocracy, that is, in any state where the gods and 
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would be to grant every Free Exercise claim, since no truth implica-
tions result from permitting the religious practice to continue.168  
However, the Court cannot decide every conflict in favor of relig-
ion—if it did, the results would be anarchically disastrous.  Consider 
the Court’s words in Reynolds: “Suppose one believed that human sac-
rifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously 
contended that the civil government under which he lived could not 
interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”169  The Court must decide certain 
cases in favor of government restriction, relying on governmental pol-
icy against the specific religious practice.  As we have seen, it has de-
cided against polygamy, against racial discrimination, in favor of 
roads, and against the use of controlled substances.  But when the 
Court decides these cases, it cannot do so and pretend that it has im-
plied nothing about the truth of the religious belief.  We are com-
fortable that the Court would deny a Free Exercise claim for the right 
to human sacrifice, but our comfort cannot come without an under-
standing of the implicit judgment resulting from this denial.  None of 
this is to suggest that the Court should not apply the principles of the 
Constitution in the face of a contrary religious belief, or that the 
principles of the Constitution are unwise in such circumstances—
nevertheless, the Constitution is not without its consequences, and 
those consequences should be acknowledged. 
Because the Court makes these implicit assertions, it cannot be 
said to be neutral toward religion.  The Court’s stated policy of not 
judging the truth of religions is bound up in the principle of neutral-
ity.170  Government can hardly be said to act neutrally between itself 
and a religion, or between religions generally, when it has implicitly 
judged some of them false. 
“Judgmental neutrality” is an accurate, if unfortunately ironic, 
way of describing the policy the Court practices now.  The Court 
should therefore modify, clarify, or abandon the neutrality principle.  
Such action is imperative in light of the fact that the Court has de-
clared that neutrality is a controlling principle in Religion Clause 
the government have concurrent jurisdiction.  See supra note 162.  Where the laws of 
the church and the laws of the state conflict, one or the other must bend.  If it is the 
church that bends, then the state, by asserting its own sovereignty, has denied the 
authority of the church.  Since one of the church’s fundamental claims is its author-
ity (that God, however defined, is the omnipotent Creator), the state has denied the 
truth of the religion along with its authority. 
 168 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
 169 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
 170 See supra Part II. 
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cases,171 and given the Court’s declarations of how strict and serious is 
the principle of neutrality.172  It does not make sense that an unwork-
able, even nonsensical principle should govern such important mat-
ters. 
Because the Court frequently decides close cases by turning to 
the neutrality principle,173 much is at stake on the idea of neutrality.  
But if the principle is not workable, and if judgments against religion 
must inevitably be made, the Court should not retain the illusion that 
neutrality can guide the resolution of important cases.  Perhaps what 
is called the principle of neutrality can be clarified, such that the 
Court will express what it is actually doing when it decides a Free Ex-
ercise case, rather than what it would like to think it is doing.  If not 
clarified, the neutrality principle should be abandoned and replaced 
with a standard more meaningful and workable. 
Further, because the Court implicitly judges some beliefs false, 
there must be that which the Court thinks is true.174  The Court be-
lieves something; it believes in the validity of governmental policy—
perhaps this is its Established religion?175  For instance, when the 
 171 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’r of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (noting 
the policy of neutrality); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (stating that 
government must be neutral in the face of religious differences); Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952) (holding that government must be denominationally 
neutral). 
 172 In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court held that “‘[t]he 
government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages 
none.’”  374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).  The Court further held that “[i]n the relationship 
between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”  
Id. at 226.  The Court has also held that “[a] central lesson of our decisions is that a 
significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment 
Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”  Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 839 (1995). 
 173 See supra Part II. 
 174 The nature of government belief, including its epistemology, faith claims, and 
the extent to which a government agency reflects or creates government belief, 
would be an interesting topic for another paper. 
 175 There is evidence of this even in one of the earliest state-court Free Exercise 
cases, where a Jewish man was required to testify on the Sabbath.  Philips v. Gratz, 2 
Pen. & W. 412, 416 (Pa. 1831).  The court stated that “[r]ightly considered, there are 
no duties half so sacred as those which the citizen owes to the laws.”  Id.  On a related 
note, Michael J. Perry persuasively argues that for governmental policy to be based 
on religious beliefs is neither a violation of the Establishment Clause, nor is it ille-
gitimate in a liberal democracy.  PERRY, supra note 152, at 20–52. 
[I]n a liberal democracy, it is altogether fitting—it is altogether “lib-
eral”—for religious believers to make political choices, including coer-
cive choices—choices to ban or require conduct—on the ground of 
what is, for them, a religious claim: that each and every person is sa-
cred, that all persons are subjects of justice.   
Id. at 51. 
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Court implicitly asserted in Bob Jones University v. United States176 that 
Almighty God did not command discriminatory practices, it was be-
cause the university’s practices contradicted federal law and the pol-
icy on which that law stood.  Thus the Court knew that governmental 
policy against discrimination was the truth upon which it made its de-
cisions, and the Court was therefore forced to restrict the religious 
practice that contradicted this truth.  The Court did not merely re-
strict the practice; it implicitly declared that the practice was not di-
vine. 
For the most part, we do not know what the Court affirmatively 
believes, because it rarely offers direct statements of its beliefs.177  
However, we can at least identify several specific doctrines that the 
Court does not believe.  The Court does not believe that God com-
mands polygamy,178 that God commands racial discrimination,179 that 
Native American worship is necessary for the salvation of mankind,180 
nor, in dicta, does the Court believe that any worthy god commands 
human sacrifice.181  In fact, that the Court does maintain these beliefs 
is one of the reasons it cannot be said to be neutral.  While it may not 
hold a specific opinion on the Noble Eightfold Path or the doctrine 
of transubstantiation, it does believe in some fundamental truth—
however amorphous that greatest-common-denominator truth may 
be182—that ultimately supports governmental policy.  
 176 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 177 For a rare exception to this generality, see the words of Justice Douglas in 
Zorach v. Clauson: “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being.”  343 U.S. at 313.  Justice Douglas has inferred the governmental belief 
in a Deity from the nature of governmental policy.  See id. 
 178 See generally Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 179 See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 180 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988). 
 181 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (noting that it would not be seriously contended 
that the state was powerless to intervene if a religion commanded human sacrifice).  
But see Genesis 22:2 (“[God] said, ‘Take your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love, 
and go to the land of Mori’ah, and offer him there as a burnt offering upon one of 
the mountains of which I shall tell you.’”).  Perhaps if the Judeo-Christian God com-
manded human sacrifice in the present (even if He were to intervene at the last in-
stant and stop the act), the Court would have a greater problem with this particular 
Deity than it has expressed to date. 
 182 While legal pragmatism—a results-oriented, anti-formalist legal philosophy—
has been advocated by such jurists as Richard Posner as a means of reaching socie-
tally amenable legal results without standing on any particular philosophical assump-
tion, see Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5, 10 (1996), 
David Luban wisely observes that none of these results are meaningful, or in any 
sense correct, absent knowledge that the philosophical assumptions undergirding 
them are true: 
[I]n principle philosophical questions have right and wrong answers, 
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Above all, this Comment does not suggest that the implicit 
judgments of the Court are inherently good or inherently bad.  The 
only normative claim made here is that the Court should be consis-
tent.  If these implicit judgments are inevitable in our legal system, 
then we should not consider the fact of judgment to be what is good 
or bad, but rather the result of the judgment.  We may ask whether 
the case was rightly decided on the law, and whether the decision was 
supported by sound policy, but we should not praise or condemn a 
case merely because it happened to judge another belief system false.  
As with many matters, this comes down to a deep question of policy, 
grounded in our fundamental moral and social values.  What do we 
as a society think of polygamy?  What do we think of racial discrimi-
nation?  What do we think of sacrificing our roads to preserve Native 
American religion?  None of these are posed as rhetorical ques-
tions—each requires an answer founded on some kind of substantive 
belief in value, and none can be answered by appealing to neutrality. 
Perhaps many readers are disturbed by the idea of the Supreme 
Court judging religions false.  In our age of tolerance and accep-
tance, where we fear the perceived ills of all religious fundamental-
ism, we are not fond of our government making absolute pro-
nouncements, even under its breath, about any religious belief.  This 
is the sort of thing that starts wars, we think, and it just does not seem 
very nice.  However, this Comment submits that each of us is far more 
comfortable with the idea of a court judging beliefs than we would 
readily either expect or admit.  Consider, in the context of criminal 
law, the deific decree defense.183  This defense is used when a defen-
dant does something horrifically atrocious, such as bludgeoning his 
wife and son, shooting a police officer, or repeatedly stabbing his 
stepmother, and then says that God commanded the action.184  
and legal decisions that presuppose philosophical positions can be 
criticized for getting them wrong.  On this line of thinking, we find a 
straightforward and relatively uncontroversial way in which legal prag-
matism cannot be freestanding.  Legal decisions will turn on right an-
swers to philosophical questions in the same way that they turn on right 
answers to factual questions.  And a judge who tries to “do” law while 
ignoring the relevant questions of first philosophy can be accused of 
intellectual and professional irresponsibility. 
Luban, supra note 152, at 51.  For objections to Luban’s argument, see Richard 
Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response to David Luban, in RORTY, supra note 152, at 
104. 
 183 For a brief synopsis of the deific decree defense, see People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 
128, 129–30 (Colo. 1992). 
 184 For cases where the deific decree defense was presented, see Serravo, 823 P.2d 
at 130–31 (defendant not guilty by reason of insanity for stabbing his wife “to sever 
the marriage bond” according to God’s command); Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242 
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Where the belief is sincerely held, it may operate as a valid defense to 
the crime.185  But we do not call it the Free Exercise defense—we call 
it the insanity defense.186  Essentially, the defendant’s religious belief 
is so grossly divergent from the society’s morals that it is entitled to 
no respect.  At best it entitles its holder to medical or psychological 
treatment rather than normal incarceration.  Thank God we are will-
ing so to judge. 
(Miss. 1986) (defendant shot police officers because God commanded the act); State 
v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999) (husband bludgeoned his wife and son with a 
hammer after God revealed he would be cast into the lake of fire if he refused to do 
so); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 351–53 (Utah 2001) (Mormon fundamentalist killed 
his sister-in-law and her infant child pursuant to divine revelation); State v. Cameron, 
674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (defendant stabbed his stepmother repeatedly 
upon God’s command to stop the “evil spirit” within her). 
 185 See Serravo, 823 P.2d at 129–30. 
 186 Id. 
